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Abstract: In this research  our attention was given to factors that define the degree of corruption (in the single state) or 
what generates corruption. In the case of five independent states of the former Yellow-black monarchy it will be found 
out how some macroeconomic pointers can influence the degree of corruption (in what part they influence). In this 
research it was found  out with the analysis of the panel data between the years 2003 and 2011 how the degree of 
corruption is influenced by the GDP, unemployment and the height of the average net revenue. As it was descovered 
that the right factors have been chosen, because it was found out that all three (3) macroeconomic pointers represent 
87.29% of all the influences on the perception of corruption. The most impact on corruption has the degree of 
unemployment so it can be concluded that the perception of corruption is determined by negative effects on the 
standard of citizens (lower income, more unemployment). 
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Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Sažetak: U ovom istraživanju this research  our attention was given to factors that define the degree of corruption (in 
the single state) or what generates corruption. In the case of five independent states of the former Yellow-black 
monarchy it will be found out how some macroeconomic pointers can influence the degree of corruption (in what part 
they influence). In this research it was found  out with the analysis of the panel data between the years 2003 and 2011 
how the degree of corruption is influenced by the GDP, unemployment and the height of the average net revenue. As it 
was descovered that the right factors have been chosen, because it was found out that all three (3) macroeconomic 
pointers represent 87.29% of all the influences on the perception of corruption. The most impact on corruption has the 
degree of unemployment so it can be concluded that the perception of corruption is determined by negative effects on 
the standard of citizens (lower income, more unemployment). 
 





Everybody tries to find out how can corruption 
impact on economy (when corruption rises, GDP falls) 
the economic growth is lower, but the question was the 
impact which determines degrees of corruption in the 
single state or perception about what generates 
corruption. 
In the case of five independent states of the former 
Yellow-black monarchy I will be found out how some 
macroeconomic pointers can influence the degree of 
corruption (how can they influence and in what part they 
influence)… 
In this  research  it was discovered  with the analysis 
of the panel data between the years 2003 and 2011 how 
the height of GDP, unemployment and the average net 
revenue can influence the degree of corruption. 
Hypothesis: GDP, unemployment and the height of 
the average net revenue instantly and insomuch influence 
the estimated degree of corruption in the single state. 
2. CORRUPTION 
  
2.1. The definition of corruption 
   
Law of integrity and prevention of corruption [1]: 
Corruption is the contravention of the treatment of the 
official authorities in public or private sector, as well as 
the treatment of the persons who act on their own 
initiative of contravention or avoid themselves of 
contravention because of directly or indirectly promised 
or given, demanded, accepted or unexpected utility for 
themselves or somebody else. 
The international corruption is the corruption where 
participates at least one legal or illegal representative 
from the foreign country. 
The consequences of corruption:  
 reduction of economic growth (consequently the 
rising the poverty) 
 the less of the inland revenue 
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 reduction of charges, from the view of corruption 
less interesting (school system) 
 trust of citizens in institutions and the principles of 
legal states is lower. 
 
2.2. Influences and consequences of corruption  
 
The influence of corruption on the operation of 
society [2] is in the long-term negative, that’s why the 
inland and international community pays much more 
attention to it. Because of negative effects, that 
corruption brings, all the states try to influence this area 
with the certain goal to prevent extending of corruption 
or at least limit it corruption represents practically all 
spheres of social and political life. It appears as a bribe, 
acquaintanceship, relation, nepotism or a privilege. It is 
not easy to discover corruption. It reduces the economic 
growth, the rising of poverty, reduces the quality of 
things being done, it causes the exhaustion of public 
sources and undermines the authenticity of politics, it 
effects the processes of judging and destabilizes 
democratic systems. 
 
2.3. The classification of corruption  
 
 petty or casual corruption (very rare examples) 
 not very important examples 
 simple systematic corruption. The corruptive 
relations are long standing and repetitive usually 
limited on the area of competence of individual 
officials  
 systematic corruption and economic crime includes 
many active and passive subjects within many years 
 systematic corruption and noneconomic crime 
which relates to organized noneconomic crime that 
includes the systematic influence of organized 
crime on the representatives of 
 legislation, forensic authorities [3] 
 
 
3. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR APPEARANCE 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF CORRUPTION 
 
Political and economic environment: The more 
regulated and limited is economic business in a state the 
higher commission and the power of officials on 
decisions brings greater possibility for appearance of 
corruption, because individuals are ready to offer 
payment to avoid limitation. Corruption influences the 
low salaries of civil servants (state officials) who are 
trying to improve their position by accepting bribes. 
Professional ethics and legislation: The back of 
professional ethics and defective laws which regularize 
the sector of corruption as culpable acts, are the very 
important cause for appearance and spreading of 
corruption. The great influence has the no affective 
sanctions of corruption which in case of being no 
affective makes a better possibility of continuation of the 
people involved, there is a great likelihood for the 
involvement other person because of no affective 
sanctions. Customs, tradition: In different states there is a 
different relationship towards corruption. In Europe we 
can find two extremes to corruption from intolerant north 
to the warm south where corruption is almost normal, 
social acceptable appearance. Or the difference between 
the states having democratic past which traditionally 
chase corruption and former socialist states, where there 
was corruption a part of the folklore tradition. 
 
 
4. NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF CORRUPTION 
 
4.1. Influence on companies  
 
Research that was accomplished by EBRD and the 
World Bank [4] makes clear that bribes paid in the small 
companies represent 5% their annual profit in the 
medium-sized companies the bribes represent 4% of their 
annual profit in comparison with bigger companies, 
where bribes represent less that 3%. So we can get the 
idea how great influence corruption has on companies or 
what position they are taken in. It enlarges their costs and 
reduces their competition and profiteering (ousting the 
companies for the market, the lower economic growth, 
more unemployment). 
 
4.2. Influence on investments 
 
Corruption may have influence on entire investments, 
on the height of public investments, as well as efficacy of 
investing decisions and projects [5]. On the presence of 
corruption the investments are smaller, because of 
awareness of contractors to bribe the officials for the 
better execution or to guarantee their participation by the 
profit. Because of the bigger costs contractors are not 
interested in investments. Employment is not given to 
somebody who is the most appropriate and classified for 
a single job, but to somebody who is prepared to pay or 
return the favour in a different way. Corruption often 
reduces efficacy of different programmes of financial 
help (as well as state and international programmes), 
because financial sources are lost and do not reach the 
ones who really need it.  
 
4.3. Influence on budget and income taxes 
 
Financial benefits coming from corruption are non-
taxable, because they are hidden. So the state loses the 
part of income from taxes. The public consumption 
which is the consequence of corruption (because of 
individual interests) leads to negative effects on the 
budget. 
 
4.4. Influence on infrastructure and public works 
 
Public works are usually worse quality and more 
expensive because of corruption. Corruption makes 
infrastructural projects more expensive, because in public 
competitive examination the best bidder is not chosen, 
but the one who got a job by the help of corruption (we 
get the infrastructure in a smaller amount or 
inappropriate quality). In both cases there are negative 
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consequences for the public budget because of elevation 
of public consumption or the smaller amount of public 
works (worse quality) and the smaller amount or the 
worse quality of infrastructure. The citizens are losing 
trust in the legal state or they are starting to practice 
corruption (on both sides).  
 
 
5. THE NEGATIVE FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF 
CORRUPTION 
 
The negative financial effects of corruption are scary, 
but notice about the standards has to be given and 
collected from the media. 
 3. 2. 2014 the European Commission published the 
report about corruption, where it estimated that 
corruption costs the European economy about 120 
billion a year. In the estimation of the European 
Commission  corruption is present at public orders, 
financing political parties in some states corruption 
is in medicine 
 The report of the United Nations shows that the cost 
of corruption in Afghanistan in the year 2012 was 
3.9 billion $ which is twice as much GDP of state 
on the other land bribes are taken by 50% of 
citizens.  
 The report of UN estimates, that the most part has 
already taken the fact that the most officials are 
taken bribes. 
 
Research of the Institute of the World Bank in April 
2004 has given evidence that more than 1 billion $ bribes 
are paid annually. 
Daniel Kaufmann [6], the director of Institute 
administered (by WBI) makes clear, that these data are 
the estimation of bribes paid all over the world in rich or 
not very rich countries. The research has shown that 
states which fight against corruption and the 
improvement of their legal state heighten their national 
incomes on the big term four times and the death-note of 
children can reduce for 75%. 
 
 
6. FACTORS WHICH IMPACT ON CORRUPTION 
(in the case of states constructed from the 
former yellow-black monarchy) 
 
Independent states constructed from the former 
yellow-black monarchy were chosen on purpose, because 
they were a part of the same state up to 1918, they had 
the only one officialdom and the same values. Of course 
there were differences between them (above all in 
development) during the years they have chosen their 
own way (the second world war, dictation, socialism) 
and there were differences between them both in legal 
aid as well as in the unemployment and in the net 
income. There were the major differences between the 
states in corruption of state organs, which were 
sometimes common and famous for their own 
bureaucratic honesty and referring to the crown (on the 
basis of officialdom individual states formed their own 
officialdom immediately offer the first world war, 
especially Austria and the former Czechoslovakia). As it 
was mentioned before the forming of officialdom has 
chosen its own way especially after the second world was 
and that was the reason that the table of corruption was 
used to measure the knowing of corruption in the public 
sector for 177 states. 
In the case of these five countries it will be found out 
if and how the height of GDP, the stage of 
unemployment and the average net income influence the 
corruption in the public sector.  
 
6.1. The chosen states, the noted pointers and 
the time limit 
 
States: Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia 
The noted pointers:  
 GDP (in % of the average GDP for 27 states in EU 
(Source: Eurostat 7) 
 The average net income (in e-source Eurostat) 
 The rate of unemployment (in %;  source: Eurostat) 
 The rate of corruption(the first table was used to 
measure the rate of corruption in public sector for 
177 states (source: Transparency International 8) 
 The time limit: 2003-2011  
 
6.2. Scatter diagrams 
 
Exploration: By the data of corruption: Mark 0 is a 
note of full corruption, mark 10 is the zero point of 
corruption (higher is the mark larger is transparency or 
lower is the mark, higher is the awareness of corruption).  
There are three diagrams: 
 Corruption towards GDP (dependence on awareness 
of corruption from GDP) 
 Corruption towards average net income 
(dependence on awareness of corruption from the 
height of net income) 
 Corruption towards the note of unemployment 
(dependence on awareness of corruption from the 
note of unemployment) 
 
 
Picture 1: Corruption (axis Y) towards GDP (axis X) 
 
Comment: The scatter diagram shows relation 
between the rate of corruption (korupcija, axis Y) and the 
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height of GDP (bdp, axis X). The higher GDP the lower 
is the rate of awareness of corruption or the better is the 
index of corruption. 
 
 
Picture 2: Corruption (axis Y) towards average net 
income (axis X) 
 
Comment: The scatter diagram shows relation 
between the note of corruption (korupcija, axis Y) and 
the average net income (netopl, axis X). Better net 




Picture 3: Corruption (axis X) towards the note of 
unemployment (axis Y) 
 
Comment: The scatter diagram shows relation 
between the note of corruption (korupcija, axis Y) and 
unemployment (nezap, axis X). The lower is the note of 
unemployment the lower is the note of corruption or 
higher is the index of corruption. 
  
6.3. The basic statistics 
 
Five states were analysed in nine time periods and 
four different variables. 
One half and more states have lower index of 
corruption from the average 5.72. There is a big 
classification between the index of corruption, between 
3.7 (a very corruptive state) up to 8.6 (very transparent 
state). The coefficient of variation shows the low 
variability.  
                          The basic statistic 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
korupcija 5,72000 5,20000 3,70000 8,60000 
bdp 84,7556 81,0000 56,0000 129,000 
nezaposl 8,00667 7,10000 3,80000 18,4000 
netoplac 9558,21 6293,04 2878,04 25349,6 
 
Variable Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
korupcija 1,46607 0,256306 0,748434 -0,712836 
bdp 23,0278 0,271697 0,924458 -0,423395 
nezaposl 3,75387 0,468843 1,25084 0,754200 
netoplac 7127,82 0,745727 1,34015 0,134520 
Table 1:  The basic statistic  - analysis of the nine-year 
period for four different variables 
 
The classification of parabola on the right side: lower 
or the same GDP from 81.00 have the half or more states. 
There is also a big classification between the lowest (56) 
and the highest (129) GDP (average 27 is 100, that 
means that the average of these five states, regardless of 
Austria which is above average lower from the average 
GDP EU 27). The variability remains low.  
The rate of unemployment is in the half or more 
states lower or the same 7.1%. This classification of 
unemployment in the part or active citizens is big from 
3.8% up to 18.4%. Variability is of medium height 
(0.468843). There is classification in the right side too. 
The greatest variability is by net income, which is 
very high. There is a big difference between the lowest 
average net income (2878.04€ a year) and the highest 
(25349,6€ a year). In the half or more states there is a 
lower income or it remains the same 6293.04€ a year. 
There is the classification of parabola in the right side. 
 
 
7. ESTIMATION OF MODELS AND THEIR 
ANALYSIS 
 
 7.1. Model of united data 
 
Model 1: Pooled OLS, using 45 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 9 
Dependent variable: korupcija 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 4,18032 0,970379 4,3079 0,00010 *** 
bdp 0,0107575 0,0141048 0,7627 0,45002  
nezaposl -0,0780349 0,0295306 -2,6425 0,01160 ** 
netoplac 0,000131063 4,23023e-05 3,0982 0,00351 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5,720000 S.D. dependent var  1,466071 
Sum squared resid  12,02093 S.E. of regression  0,541473 
R-squared  0,872891 Adjusted R-squared  0,863591 
F(3, 41)  93,85279 P-value(F)  2,11e-18 
Log-likelihood -34,15194 Akaike criterion  76,30388 
Schwarz criterion  83,53053 Hannan-Quinn  78,99790 
rho  0,808297 Durbin-Watson  0,239559 
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7.2. Model of unit data with robust valuation 
 
Model 2: Pooled OLS, using 45 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 9 
Dependent variable: korupcija 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 4,18032 0,85106 4,9119 0,00001 *** 
bdp 0,0107575 0,0221515 0,4856 0,62981  
nezaposl -0,0780349 0,0248685 -3,1379 0,00315 *** 
netoplac 0,000131063 8,25917e-05 1,5869 0,12022  
 
Mean dependent var  5,720000 S.D. dependent var  1,466071 
Sum squared resid  12,02093 S.E. of regression  0,541473 
R-squared  0,872891 Adjusted R-squared  0,863591 
F(3, 41)  93,85279 P-value(F)  2,11e-18 
Log-likelihood -34,15194 Akaike criterion  76,30388 
Schwarz criterion  83,53053 Hannan-Quinn  78,99790 
rho  0,808297 Durbin-Watson  0,239559 
 
7.3. Model of fixed effects 
 
Model 3: Pooled OLS, using 45 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 9 
Dependent variable: korupcija 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
bdp -0,0080028 0,0171312 -0,4671 0,64313  
nezaposl -0,123828 0,0335469 -3,6912 0,00072 *** 
netoplac 5,31454e-06 4,58241e-05 0,1160 0,90830  
du_1 9,66106 2,00734 4,8129 0,00003 *** 
du_2 7,74395 1,47519 5,2495 <0,00001 *** 
du_3 6,12131 1,40533 4,3558 0,00010 *** 
du_4 6,47786 1,17972 5,4910 <0,00001 *** 
du_5 6,69048 1,37612 4,8618 0,00002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5,720000 S.D. dependent var  1,466071 
Sum squared resid  3,682033 S.E. of regression  0,315459 
R-squared  0,961066 Adjusted R-squared  0,953701 
F(7, 37)  130,4764 P-value(F)  4,21e-24 
Log-likelihood -7,530294 Akaike criterion  31,06059 
Schwarz criterion  45,51389 Hannan-Quinn  36,44863 
rho  0,583973 Durbin-Watson  0,740321 
 
7.4. Model of informal data with rubust variables 
 
Model 4: Pooled OLS, using 45 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 9 
Dependent variable: korupcija 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 9,66106 2,00924 4,8083 0,00003 *** 
bdp -0,0080028 0,0123984 -0,6455 0,52261  
nezaposl -0,123828 0,0375003 -3,3020 0,00213 *** 
netoplac 5,31454e-06 5,84057e-05 0,0910 0,92799  
du_2 -1,91711 0,889128 -2,1562 0,03764 ** 
du_3 -3,53975 1,02702 -3,4466 0,00143 *** 
du_4 -3,18319 1,11769 -2,8480 0,00714 *** 
du_5 -2,97057 1,07372 -2,7666 0,00879 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  5,720000 S.D. dependent var  1,466071 
Sum squared resid  3,682033 S.E. of regression  0,315459 
R-squared  0,961066 Adjusted R-squared  0,953701 
F(7, 37)  130,4764 P-value(F)  4,21e-24 
Log-likelihood -7,530294 Akaike criterion  31,06059 
Schwarz criterion  45,51389 Hannan-Quinn  36,44863 
rho  0,583973 Durbin-Watson  0,740321 
 
7.5. Model of coincidental effects 
 
Model 5: Random-effects (GLS), using 45 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 9 
Dependent variable: korupcija 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5,61926 1,35836 4,1368 0,00017 *** 
bdp 0,007092 0,0161109 0,4402 0,66211  
nezaposl -0,107381 0,0333627 -3,2186 0,00252 *** 
netoplac 3,76031e-05 4,49179e-05 0,8372 0,40736  
 
Mean dependent var  5,720000 S.D. dependent var  1,466071 
Sum squared resid  32,87373 S.E. of regression  0,884708 
Log-likelihood -56,78749 Akaike criterion  121,5750 
Schwarz criterion  128,8016 Hannan-Quinn  124,2690 
 
'Within' variance = 0,0995144 
'Between' variance = 0,74829 
theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0,878441 
Breusch-Pagan test - 
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 48,3999 
with p-value = 3,47595e-012 
Hausman test - 
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(3) = 6,76206 
with p-value = 0,0798812 
 
 
8. COMPARISON OF MODELS AND THEIR 
CHOICE 
 
8.1. Comparison of models of informal effects 
and united data 
 
  Using Breusch-Pagan test, which estimates if the 
variance of the specific error is the equal of 0 we choose 
Tehnički glasnik 8, 3(2014), 203-209 207
Šumah Š., Klopotan I., Mahič E.                                                                                                                              Factors which impact on corruption in the public sector 
 
the model of united data is chosen if the variance from 0 
is different the model of informal effects is used. In this 
case (p-value is 3.47595e-12), that is the reason that 
between the models of informal data the united data, the 
model of informal effects was chosen. 
 
8.2. Comparison of the model of fixed and 
informal effects 
 
For the comparison of these two models we can use the 
Hausman’s test, it  estimates if the GLS  marks are 
consistent,   the model of informal effects is presented, if 
not  the model of fixed effects is chosen. Because of 
relatively high p-value (p-value is 0.0798812)  the model 
of informal effects was used. 
 
8.3. Comparison of the model of united data and 
the model of fixed effects 
 
 The model of united data can be used if there is no 
difference in constant or if there is not effect of units. If 
there is one constant different from 0 we can use the 
model of fixed effects, it means that there is an effect of 
units present. With the F-test  the p-value is being 
chosen. 
F(7, 37): area to the right of 4,2e-020 =~ 1 
(to the left: 1,31075e-067) 
F-test estimates, that p-value is different from 0 so we 
can choose the model of fixed effects. 
 
8.4. Model of united data – comment 
 
On the basis of comparison   the model of united data 
was chosen as the most appropriate, because the 
Breusch-Pagan’s test seemed better than the model of 
informal effects and using F-test better from the model of 
fixed effects. Between the two models of united data the 
model without robust valuation was selected. 
Comment: 
        
Corruption = 4.18032 + 0.0107575*GDP – 
0.0780349*unemployment + 0.000131063*net income 
 
1. 45 observations were analysed in nine different time 
periods, so five states and four variables. 
2. Using R- squared 87.29% of all the influence on the 
rate of corruption is explained, so we can definitely 
say that GDP, the rate of unemployment and the 
height of net income in the state have a very strong 
influence on corruption (87.29% of all the influence 
on corruption) 
3. The longer GDP leads to the longer index of 
corruption (lower corruption) – directional 
coefficient is positive. Because the rate of 
unemployment has the negative directional 
coefficient it shows us that larger unemployment 
has lower index of corruption or corruption is 
higher. The smaller effect like augmenting of GDP 
has the growth of net income (positive coefficient) 
and has the positive influence on the index of 
corruption (it lowers the perception of corruption) 
4. If the GDP rises for 1% (GDP is in % from EU 
27=100) the index of corruption enlarges in the 
average of 0.0107575% by the assumption that 
unemployment and net income do not change. But it 
needs to be added, that for GDP we cannot be 95% 
sure that GDP affects the rate of corruption. 
5. If unemployment rises for 1% (unemployment is 
handed in %) the index of corruption is lower for 
0.0780349% by the assumption ceteris paribus. The 
p-value is very low, what is the pointer of 
statistically typical influence of unemployment on 
the index of corruption. 
6. If the net income rises for 1%, index of corruption 
is larger for 0.000131063%. The p-value is also 
very low, which shows the statistic influence of net 
income on corruption. 
P(F) is very small, that proves the linear connection 





Hypothesis: GDP, unemployment and the height of 
average net income directly influence on the marked sate 
of corruption in a single state, was confirmed  by this 
research, because these three factors estimate 87.29% of 
all the influence on the perception of corruption. 
GDP does not statistically influence corruption or 
perception of corruption. Very little (but statistically 
typical) influence on the perception of corruption has the 
height of net income, a great influence has 
unemployment (by the raising of unemployment and 
lowering the net income we can see the larger perception 
of corruption), that is more or less expected, because 
people observe corruption more critically by falling of 
life standard, we can also say that by higher note of 
general standard (larger net income, lower 
unemployment) there is higher tolerance of corruption, 
which means that people have a very strange relationship 
with corruption, when we get on well we do not notice it, 
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